Two years after 9/11, our seaports still aren’t safe from attack. A thoughtful and detailed analysis as to our weaknesses in this area.
The fundamental problem? Who puts the bell on the cat?
In other words, who pays for port security? Does the government as a whole pay for it? Do the people who import pay for it? And if the costs are born by the importers, how cheap is that labor in China if you add in screening costs? Do you think Wal-Mart is interested in adding in those costs?
The unspoken problem with this analysis is the problem of soft target re-acquisition. If you harden the ports sufficently, won’t the terrorist networks simply re-target a softer port. A fishing vessel hauling in a boat full of kippers requires no manifest and will put into any port they desire.
The key is to pursue the terrorists in their homes. Disrupt their planning cycle sufficiently that they cannot plan these attacks.
The problem is that in the mean time they are still planning the attacks and will probably pull off a successful one before the end of the decade.
So we still need to harden, despite the fragility that such defenses will offer. If we don’t harden, they will attack there. If we do harden, they will re-acquire a new target.
And so the dance continues.